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Deconstructing the Profligacy Myth Using 
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This article is aimed at deconstructing the widely spread view according to 
many media outlets, policy analysts and commentators that the Greek crisis 
and the subsequent eurocrisis is the result of generous social welfare benefits 
and fiscal spending irresponsibility on the part of Greek politicians and citi-
zens. The lesson to be drawn from this analysis is multifold. In attempting to 
do so, I will use critical theory of international relations in order to dissect the 
very structure of the EMU which inevitably led to the build-up of trade and fis-
cal imbalances in the EU’s periphery as a first theoretical line of argumentation 
in contesting this view. The second theoretical line of argumentation focuses 
on social constructivism and its credentials in dealing with the underlying is-
sue of “Greek profligacy”. The diffusion of conservative attitudes regarding 
social welfare is put into the broader context of “new constitutionalism” and 
neoliberal politics. The application of both theories is aimed at identifying ba-
sic culprits which brought about the deadly mix of European banking crisis and 
sovereign debt crisis, and thereby points to a necessary change in policy stance 
toward “PIIGS” countries and the very foundation of the EMU.
Keywords: critical theory, social constructivism, EMU, eurozone crisis, Greek 
profligacy, embedded neoliberalism
Introduction
All versions of mainstream integration theory assume that market forces are ex-
pressions of an inner rationality of human nature, and that the market constitutes 
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the “realm of freedom” standing in opposition to the state. Thus both intergovern-
mentalists of a realist persuasion and functionalists of a liberal internationalist back-
ground assume that power and interest are strictly contained in the sphere of inter-
state affairs (Cafruny and Ryner, 2003: 5). This is the consequence of neo-realism 
and neoliberal institutionalism domination in IR theory in the 1980s and their indi-
vidualistic and materialistic underpinnings. The disagreement between these theo-
retical schools is essentially an inter-paradigm debate and it centers on the extent to 
which the “anarchy” of interstate relations limits the realization of a putative “inner 
rationality” inherent in market forces and free trade as the propulsion engine of eco-
nomic integration (Barnett, 2010: 252-270). As opposed to this view, some authors 
such as Justin Rosenberg claim that anarchy is a condition of capitalist relations, 
and not a set of circumstances confined to international relations as a transhistorical 
feature of relations between states (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2010: 245). Therefore, 
the subject of this analysis is not power dynamics between two states, Germany and 
Greece, but their roles as part of a wider EMU architecture and crisis pertained to it. 
Critical theory and social constructivism are at the very pinnacle of deconstructing 
the myth of Greek profligacy and its wider socio-economic consequences. Chapter 
one deals with “embedded neoliberalism” and explains its meaning by using criti-
cal theory of IR. Chapter two focuses on the merits of social constructivism in de-
termining how the post-crisis public discourse has been shaped by particular socio-
-economic interests. The modelling of the Greek fiscal crisis in the third part of this 
article serves to underline some of the ideas laid out in the previous chapter. The 
last chapter discusses the wider socio-economic and political consequences of the 
Greek crisis and eurocrisis and of the current crisis-solving approach.
1. “Embedded Neoliberalism” – Critical Theory @ Work
Robert Cox’s seminal article Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond In-
ternational Relations Theory represents one of the first attempts to bring critical 
theory into the discourse of the international political economy (Cox and Schechter, 
2002). Cox is perhaps best-known for having distinguished between “problem solv-
ing” and “critical theory” approaches in IR. He conceives the former in terms of the 
use of scientific variables to explain and measure the causal impact of state behav-
iour, and the latter as an open-ended reflexive theory of the social forces of the in-
ternational political economy that focuses on the transformation of social practices 
(Roach, 2008: 267). In this context, Cox draws upon Gramsci’s notion of hegemony 
and transposes it to the international realm, arguing that hegemony is as important 
for maintaining stability and continuity at this level as it is at the domestic level 
(Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2010: 237). Hegemony is a central concept of neo-Gram-
scian thought and it is understood as a particular form of dominance of a class, or 
a particular class fraction, within a specific political space from both material and 
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ideological perspectives, and we may refer to it as a historical bloc. In the contem-
porary world, the dominant forces of globalisation are constituted by a neoliberal 
historical bloc that practices a politics of supremacy within and across nations. A 
careful analysis shows that the social forces underpinning European integration are 
not necessarily internal to the EU or its member states, but must rather be located 
within a global political economy in which capitalist production and finance are 
undergoing a sustained transnationalisation and globalisation, reflected in the in-
creasing dominance of the transnational corporation (TNC) as an actor in the world 
economy and the concomitant growing structural power of transnational capital 
(Van Apeldoorn, 2000: 158). This structure is often labelled “embedded neoliberal-
ism” as a replacement for what famous political scientist John Ruggie termed “em-
bedded liberalism” during the Bretton Woods era (Cerny, 2008).
When defining the meaning of “embedded neoliberalism”, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the understanding of neoliberalism as an ideologically-driven 
strategy to free markets from states on the one hand, and a materially-driven form 
of social rule which has involved the liberalization of markets through state inter-
vention and management on the other.1 An increase in state power has always been 
the inner logic of neoliberalism, because government needs to be highly intrusive 
in order to inject markets into every corner of social life. Neoliberalism has created 
a market state rather than a small state. Shrinking the state has proved politically 
impossible, so neoliberals have turned instead to using the state to reshape social 
institutions on the model of the market.2 Applying this set of circumstances to the 
European integration, the core business of the EU has been economic integration 
in promoting four “freedoms” of movement. Almost all policy since its inception 
was predicated on the belief that creating a shareholder-friendly system of corporate 
ownership and governance, underpinned by a securities market-based financial sys-
tem, would stimulate higher levels of investment and growth in Europe (McCann, 
2010). Therefore, “embedded neoliberalism” is constituted of: 
1. Primacy of supranational marketisation
2. Neoliberal competitiveness discourse
3. Only limited embeddedness at the national level
4. Creating a transnational free space for capital
5. Asymmetrical socio-economic governance: democratically legitimated na-
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With the project of “embedded neoliberalism” it is recognised that the free 
market processes need to be embedded in order to maintain legitimacy, thus main-
taining corporatist structures and a certain role of the state in the provision of social 
services. However, these fading aspects of class compromise (market-correcting 
social policies, welfare provision) are embedded in member state structures, and it 
is their duty to maintain them. At the same time these countries are obliged to ad-
here to the deflationary and deregulatory bias of EU policies, such as the EMU and 
competition policy (Bradanini, 2009). Indeed, one could argue that the democratic 
deficit of the EU, on the one hand, and the increasing dominance of social forces 
tied with transnational capital and its largely neoliberal project, on the other, are two 
sides of the same coin and they reflect a wider phenomenon that Stephen Gill (2008: 
138) calls “new constitutionalism”.4 This is defined as the politico-legal dimension 
of the wider discourse of disciplinary neoliberalism seeking to separate economic 
policies from broad political accountability in order to make governments more re-
sponsive to the discipline of market forces and correspondingly less responsive to 
popular-democratic forces and processes (Gill, 2008).
In explaining how European integration arrived at this particular set of circum-
stances, it is necessary to use three non-antithetic processes. Realizing the difficul-
ties implied by a multiple veto point political system, policy-makers representing 
the transnational class of businessmen and investors have employed three tactics to 
implement economic liberalization. First, they have sought to circumvent the na-
tional arena by supporting economic liberalization through the backdoor of the EU; 
second, they have attempted to secure union compliance or even support for un-
popular economic measures by unions (Germany); third, they have rhetorically pre-
sented economic liberalization as the only possible path, thus applying the Thatch-
erite slogan of “there is no alternative” (Menz, 2005: 47). At the heart of this current 
transformation is what Cox calls the “internationalization of the state”, whereby the 
state becomes little more than an instrument for restructuring national economies so 
that they are more responsive to the demands and disciplines of the capitalist global 
economy (Burchill et al, 2005).
The cornerstone of this transformation is definitely the EMU and the way it is 
constructed. Hereby, it is important to recognize the difference between sovereign 
and non-sovereign currencies. Namely, a government with a non-sovereign curren-
cy, issuing debts either in foreign currency or in domestic currency pegged to fo-
4 Here, we can point out two fractions of the dominant transnational class which emerged in the 
1980s, the globalist fraction with its background in financial institutions and neoliberal para-
digm, and the Europeanist fraction drawing its neo-mercantile stance from its position of import-
-competing industries serving the needs of the European market. W. Kampeter makes a distinc-
tion between real and financial capital factions. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/08081.pdf
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reign currency (or to precious metal), faces solvency risk, whereas a government that 
spends by using its own floating and nonconvertible currency cannot be forced into 
debt. The problem with the eurozone is that each nation gave up its sovereign cur-
rency in favor of the euro. National central banks have to get euro reserves at the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) for clearing purposes, and the ECB in turn is prohibited 
from buying the public debt of governments.5 This is similar to the situation of indi-
vidual US states, which, along with the euro nations, need to tax or borrow in order 
to spend.6 As former Prime Minister of France, Michel Rocard, put it succinctly:
We cannot blame today’s crisis solely on our current and recent governments’ actions. 
For more than 20 years, the world’s major capitalist economies have been led to borrow 
heavily and unabashedly, in large by a new rule, adopted worldwide beginning in the 
1970’s and 1980’s, that tied monetary policy to targets for price growth. This dangerous 
idea – proposed in France by Jacques Rueff in 1958, adopted throughout Europe over 
the following two decades, and extended to the European Central Bank – was intended 
to limit the tendency of capitalist economies to aggravate inflation as soon as they hit 
full employment. But the rule ultimately had the terrifying result of obliging countries to 
borrow from private banks at market prices to guarantee their treasuries’ integrity. This 
created powerful barriers to public investment, as government spending was siphoned 
into massive profits for banks and their shareholders.7
Exactly this kind of political and economic realignment would be impossible 
to establish had there been no separation of the “economic” and the “political”, the 
“public” and the “private”, so that, in neoliberal discourse, key public institutions 
such as central banks are represented as non-political or beyond politics, and as only 
operating in the economic sphere.8 In the end, even purportedly apolitical and tech-
nocratic institutions such as the ECB and policy fixes such as austerity measures are 
deeply entrenched socially and politically. This is precisely the context in which the 
Greek crisis and the eurocrisis could emerge and jeopardize the historical achieve-
ments of European integration.
2. Social Constructivism and Eurozone Crisis
The social construction of reality is concerned not only with how we see the world 
but also with how we see ourselves, define our interests and determine what consti-
5 For the EMU to function properly, the European Central Bank has to adopt a Fed-like ap-
proach, where monetary policy has the additional goal of stimulating growth and employment. 
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tutes acceptable action. The very structure that actors create and re-create is heavily 
dependent on the distinction between the logic of consequences and the logic of ap-
propriateness.9 Social reality is a normative structure that is simultaneously external 
and internal to the actors. It is external in the sense that it represents constraint on 
their ability to achieve their goals. It is also internal because the normative structure 
establishes culturally and historically specific ways in which actors think and the 
norms that guide what is acceptable.10 The eurozone crisis offers ample evidence for 
validating social constructivism conclusions regarding institutional isomorphism 
and three stages of the lifecycle of norms, such as the introduction of the consti-
tutional debt brakes and of the “embedded financial orthodoxy” from the stage of 
norm emergence to the stage of norm internalization.11 One of the great paradox-
es is that the periphery’s generally left-wing governments (Papandreu, Zapatero) 
adopted so enthusiastically the ECB’s right-wing economic nostrums – austerity as 
an appropriate response to a Great Recession. The answer to this puzzling question 
of why left-wing parties embrace the advice of ultra-right-wing economists whose 
anti-regulatory dogmas helped to cause the crisis can to a large extent be explained 
by social constructivism. This sort of policy is self-destructive to the economy and 
suicidal politically, so mainstream theories of economic integration cannot account 
for their rationale.12 Unfortunately, conventional integration theories tend to focus 
largely on the institutional form of the integration process and problem-solving ap-
proaches, while ignoring the question of its socio-economic content.
Andrew Gamble summarized the constructivist view on crises when he ob-
served that “a crisis is not a natural event, but a social event, and therefore is always 
socially constructed and highly political” (Gamble, 2009: 38). In his 2009 book, 
The Specter at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession, Andrew 
Gamble, a respected political economist at the University of Cambridge, reminded 
us wittingly of the above-mentioned fact. Generally, people ascribe different mean-
9 The logic of consequences attributes human behaviour to the anticipated costs and benefits 
of particular action. This logic, then, highlights how action is driven by an actor’s calculation 
of how a particular strategy is likely to further his or her preferences. The logic of appropriate-
ness, however, suggests that actors are rule-following. They determine their course of action 
depending on a sense of self and what is appropriate for the situation. The case of Spanish and 
Portuguese governments which in 2011 introduced harsh austerity measures in spite of almost 
certain electoral defeat confirm that in many instances the logic of appropriateness simply pre-
vails (Barnett, 2010).
10 Ibid. 
11 The norm of “embedded financial orthodoxy” was first systemically described by Phillipe G. 
Cerny in his seminal article Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Glo-
balization (Cerny, 1997).
12 http://www.creditwritedowns.com/2011/06/replacing-economic-democracy-financial.html 
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ings to different events, depending on their particular interpretations and ideologi-
cal preconceptions, and the ideas and narratives that emerge during a crisis end up 
playing a crucial role in the way in which the crisis is subsequently addressed by 
policy-makers. After carefully observing the current crisis of the neoliberal accu-
mulation model, it is premature to talk of a new dispensation or a new relationship 
between the state and the market. One reason for this is relatively simple: as long as 
a new intellectual and political framework for wealth creation remains unarticulated 
or fails to impress, people tend to cling to perceived wisdom.13 Therefore, the social 
constructivist approach can be very helpful in debating how the current crisis is be-
ing solved and with what purpose, and what course of action might next emerge. 
After the most devastating crisis which tottered the world since the Great De-
pression, the world’s financial institutions pleaded for a taxpayer-funded bailout of 
the global financial system, chorusing that they are too big to fail. They got what 
they wanted: according to the IMF, the 34 states that it classifies as “advanced 
economies” spent approximately 55 percent of their respective GDPs on capital 
injections, liability guarantees and outright purchases of bad assets from the major 
banks.14 Nearly every advanced industrialized country in the world embarked on a 
policy of Keynesian stimulus to reflate their national economies against prolonged 
deflation. As British economic historian Robert Skidelsky has put it, “the Master” 
has returned, pushing aside many of the fiscally conservative tenets of the Washing-
ton consensus. What followed thereafter is a remarkable U-turn in the policy stance 
of the world’s most developed economies, which signals that conservative forces 
hijacked the debate on how to solve the crisis. The main reason for a deepening 
eurozone crisis, which is poised to become a U-shaped curve, can be easily found 
in the Troika’s policy stance ahead of the EU summit in December 2011.15 Accord-
ing to it, all member states are required to pursue fiscal austerity simultaneously as 
they are depicted as profligate and uncompetitive economies. They will be subject 
to tough fiscal targets, and if they fail to meet them, they will effectively have to 
cede sovereignty to the Troika constituted of the European Commission, the ECB 
and the IMF. This episode serves as a reminder that even central banks are political 
institutions, with a political agenda, and that independent central banks tend to be 
captured cognitively by the banks that they are supposed to regulate.
“Populist” rhetoric to the effect that perhaps creditors should also pay a share 
of the costs, as vented by Chancellor Merkel in early 2010, was quickly abandoned 





Politička misao, god. 49, br. 2, 2012, str. 7-29
14
public debt. Now the talk is about the need to shift, in the words of the German Fi-
nance Minister, from old-fashioned “government”, which is no longer up to the new 
challenges of globalization, to “governance”, meaning in particular a lasting curtail-
ment of the budgetary authority of the Bundestag (Streeck, 2011: 27). Many econo-
mists and financial analysts tend to repeat the fear of financial contagion that could 
ensue unless governments slash their budgets, which would then inevitably lead to 
more confidence in the financial markets. But the real problem stems from another 
form of contagion: bad ideas move easily across borders, and misguided economic 
notions on both sides of the Atlantic have been reinforcing each other.16 Instead of 
“instilling confidence” in public finances by adhering to austerity measures, policy-
-makers are trapped between Scylla of not implementing austerity measures while 
losing credit rating and Charybdis of implementing austerity measures and ending 
up in a deflationary trap with the same result. The same large multinational finan-
cial firms that sought government bailouts are now shocked and surprised by the 
spending of “profligate” governments. Indeed, these actors are now speculating 
against the very governments who brought them back to life by shorting their debt. 
Many of the assumptions of neoliberalism have been discredited, but there is little 
fresh thinking of what might replace it, and many neoliberal ideas are already reap-
pearing by default.17
It seems useful to distinguish three distinct moments in the trajectory of neoli-
beralism, namely: first, neoliberalism as a deconstructive project, in which neolibe-
ralism emerges as the concept with the most convincing analytical and prescriptive 
framework of the crisis of Keynesianism, and defeats corporate liberalism and so-
cial democracy in one country after another. Second, neoliberalism as a constructive 
project, or the phase of the imposition of structural adjustment, liberalization, de-
regulation, and privatization; corporate liberalism is discredited, no new alternative 
can be articulated, and the tenets of neoliberalism are increasingly accepted as valid 
and legitimate. Third, neoliberalism in its consolidation phase, in which, interna-
tionally as well as within the countries of the advanced capitalist world, any notion 
of an alternative to the global rule of capital has become utterly unrealistic and dis-
credited, and neoliberal reforms are locked in (Van Apeldoorn et al, 2003: 38). After 
each crisis in the late 20th and early 21th century, an explanation emerges, which the 
next crisis proves wrong, or at least inadequate. The 1980s Latin American crisis 
was apparently caused by excessive borrowing; but that could not explain Mexico’s 
1994 crisis, so it was attributed to undersaving. Then came East Asia, which had 
high savings rates, so the new explanation was “governance”. But this, too, made 
little sense, given the case of Scandinavian countries with the most transparent go-
16 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz141/English 
17 http://www.policy-network.net/publications_download.aspx?ID=3608 
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vernance in the world who also suffered a crisis in the early 1990s. But there is a 
common thread running through all these cases, as well as the 2008 crisis: finan-
cial sectors behaved badly, and failed to assess creditworthiness and manage risk as 
they were supposed to do.18 Unfortunately, this kind of conclusion was shoved aside 
soon after the initial stimulus in 2009 began to show first signs of recovery. Deficit 
reduction, the appeasement of foreign investors and the calming of global capital 
markets have replaced fiscal stimulus, financial regulation and progressive taxation 
as top priorities within the eurozone, and I shall analyze in detail how the debate 
changed in the case of Greece. 19
3. The Case of “Greek Profligacy” 
Some observers argue that the Greek crisis exposes the profligacy of the Greek go-
vernment and its citizens. But the whole story has many layers, and the inefficient 
public sector in Greece is only one of many. Soon after the Greek crisis became 
evident in February 2010, most of German media outlets started bashing Greece 
and its citizens because of their “lazy character, profligacy and rascal mentality”. 
Unfortunately, this kind of discourse suddenly lost from sight the crucial dimension 
of the eurozone crisis, and that is a causal relation which goes from European bank-
ing crisis to sovereign debt crisis and not vice versa.20 All of a sudden, sovereign 
states and their public finances became the main target of complaint by the busi-
ness community, the media and the leading politicians. “Bild” asked dramatically: 
Reißt Griechenland die deutschen Banken in die Pleite?21 (15. 02. 2010), and added 
scandalous headings such as: Ihr griecht nix von uns22 (05. 03. 2010), and: Verkauft 
doch Eure Inseln, Ihr Pleite-Griechen23 (04. 03. 2010).24 Especially provoking and 
bringing verdict in advance was the front page of the German weekly “Focus” with 
the heading: Betrüger in der Euro-Familie (22. 02. 2010).25 Not long thereafter poli-





21 Will Greece pull German banks into bankruptcy?
22 You get nothing from us.
23 Sell your islands, you broke Greeks!
24 http://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/medien_politik_wirtschaft/griechenland287.
html 
25 Cheaters in the EU family (http://www.focus.de/magazin/videos/focus-titel-betrueger-in-der-
euro-familie_vid_15672.html).
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It is also about not being able to retire earlier in countries such as Greece, Spain, 
Portugal than in Germany, instead everyone should try a little bit to make the same 
efforts – that is important. We can’t have a common currency where some get lots 
of vacation time and others very little. That won’t work in the long term.26
Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle of FDP said on May 18, 2011:
It’s also hard to explain, that people in Germany retire with 67 while countries that 
ask for help hesitate to make adjustments in their own pension systems.27 
It is evident that much of the debate started to revolve around adjusting the 
pension system, which had been perceived as one of the main causes propelling the 
bloated public sector while totally neglecting deep structural issues such as “new 
constitutionalism” of the EMU. Contrary to expectations, those remarks on the de-
sign of the Greek pension systems rely on false data. Figure 1 shows the difference 




Figure 1. Official and average retirement age 
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according to the OECD data.28 The official retirement age in Greece is 57 years, and 
in Germany 65, but the real retirement age in both countries is similar – 61.9 and 
61.8. The same narrative is repeated with the average number of working hours. 
Contrary to some media reports, workers in Greece work longer hours than in Ger-
many (an annual average of 2,161 hours per worker in 2009, as opposed to 1,382 
in Germany).29 The OECD data show that the usual average weekly hours worked 
on the main job in Germany aggregate to 35.7, and in Greece to unexpected 42.3 
hours.30
In reality, Greece has one of the lowest per capita incomes in Europe, its social 
safety net is truly modest, and its welfare system administrative costs are lower than 
those of Germany.31 Further, the Greek social safety nets might seem very gene-
rous by US standards, but are truly modest compared to the rest of Europe. On ave-
rage, from 1998-2007 Greece spent only €3530.47 per capita on social protection 
benefits, slightly less than Spain’s spending and about €700 more than Portugal’s, 
which has one of the lowest levels in the entire eurozone.32 By contrast, Germany 
and France spent more than double the Greek level, while the original Eurozone 12 
level averaged €6251.78. Even Ireland, which has one of the most neoliberal econo-
mies in the euro area, spent more on social protection than the supposedly profligate 
Greeks.33 Convinced by the myth that it had been the profligacy of an excessively 
burdened welfare state that had caused the Greek debt crisis, the neoliberals went on 
the offensive. As we have just observed, there are many other European countries 
that spend far more than Greece, but do not find themselves facing a fiscal crisis. 
In 2009, government expenditures in Greece totalled 50.4 percent of GDP.34 In fact, 
total government spending for the European Union as a whole equalled 50.7 percent 
of GDP, actually a bit higher than Greece.35 Ten of the 27 countries in the European 
Union spent more than Greece in 2009, several by as much as 5 percentage points 
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Even the spending on pensions, which is the main target of the neoliberals, is 
lower than in other European countries. The evidence is not consistent with the pic-
ture presented in the media of an overly generous welfare state.37 The huge fiscal 
deficit which amounted to 10.5 percent in 2010 is the result of two factors rarely 
perceived in public debate.38 The first factor refers to a rudimentary tax collection 
mechanism and widespread tax evasion, and the second to automatic stabilizers that 
kicked in after recession had started. In 2009 Greece collected just 36.9 percent of 
GDP in total government revenues, and this reflected a longstanding problem, as 
from 2001 to 2007 Greece consistently collected far less in revenue than a typical 
EU country.39 For the European Union as a whole, annual government revenue ave-
raged 44.4 percent of GDP. For Greece, the average was 39.4 percent (Figure 3).40 
Based on well-established economic models, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) esti-
mates that over the past decade ending with 2009, Greece lost an estimated US$160 






Figure 2. Average annual total government expenditures, as a share of GDP, 
2001-2007
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is indicative for the political economy of Mediterranean ex-dictatorships, where new 
democracies failed to change the political, social and economic climate when they 
decided to enter into a compromise with the pre-democratic and quasi-feudal elite.42
The second factor behind the Greek deficit should be sought in the additional 
private sector saving (or reduction of private sector deficit), plus additional net im-
ports. Greece has chronically run up a current account deficit as well as a private 
sector deficit. During recessions, the private sector cuts spending and tries to in-
crease savings, moving the government balance further into deficit territory as auto-
matic stabilizers kick in.43 Everything mentioned above shows that, on a more fun-
damental level, the whole idea of focusing on countries as units of analysis appears 
problematic. As we are dealing with consensual international exchange, it seems 
more appropriate to focus on both ends of these exchange relations. The question 
“why was there so much borrowing?” thus automatically becomes “why was there 
so much lending?” and vice versa. The desire to identify entire countries as “com-
petitive” or as “responsible for the crisis” fails to recognize the two-sided nature of 





Figure 3. Total revenue collected, as a share of GDP
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From the very beginning of the EMU crucial institutions, the European Com-
mission and the European Central Bank, led by mainstream economic thinking, 
were not up to their task of controlling the core of the system effectively. A huge 
gap in competitiveness among the member states has arisen due, on the one hand, 
to German wage-dumping policy and, on the other, to wage growth in Southern 
Europe which is above the growth of productivity plus the inflation target of 2% 
(Flassbeck and Spiecker, 2011). Recognition of socio-economic heterogeneity in 
Europe as the background to unequal economic competitiveness has led to the false 
conclusion that Germany should be taken as a good example for other Euro-states 
to follow.45 While in the long-run there might be no clear positive relationship be-
tween fiscal deficit and current account deficit, they definitely have gone hand in 
hand since Greece introduced euro in 2002 (Figure 4) (Panagiotidis, 2010).
In essence, euro adoption allowed countries like Greece access to credit at 
lower rates than their economies could ever justify based on their own fundamen-
tals. The cost of borrowing in peripheral European countries was greatly reduced 
due, in part, to the implied guarantee that once they joined the eurozone their debt 
45 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/08244.pdf 
Figure 4
Kotarski, K., Deconstructing the Profligacy Myth Using Critical Theory...
21
would be as solid as Germany’s government debt.46 Since the outburst of the crisis, 
Germany blames it on the countries that have lost competitiveness and run up their 
debts while ignoring massive capital inflows from Germany and France that had 
made it possible in the first place.47 Leverage ratios of leading German and French 
banks speak in favor of this view. In September 2011, Deutsche Bank’s leverage ra-
tio made up 52:1, Commerzbank’s 35:1, Credit Agricole’s 70:1 and BNP Paribas’s 
36:1, and this should be put into the context of the 44:1 leverage ratio of Lehman 
Brothers at the time when it crashed and caused the global credit crunch.48 Conse-
quently, Germany places all the burden of adjustment on debtor countries such as 
Greece. But this ignores Germany’s major share of responsibility for the currency 
and banking crises, if not for the sovereign-debt crisis. When the euro was intro-
duced, it was expected to bring about convergence among eurozone economies. 
Instead, it brought about divergence.49 Figure 5 on the next page clearly shows this 
divergence in terms of unit labor costs and recommended course of action to elimi-
nate this gap (Flassbeck and Spiecker, 2011).
While it may be politically convenient to separate the world into the virtu-
ous and competitive surplus countries on the one hand, and the irresponsible and 
uncompetitive debtor countries on the other, this perception is based on an overly 
simplified understanding of economic theory. It is ironic that Germany bashes its 
neighbors for their “profligacy”, but relies on their “living beyond their means” to 
produce a trade surplus that allows its government to run smaller budget deficits 
(see Figure 6 on the next page, which shows trade surplus/deficit in % of GDP).50 
Europe runs an approximately balanced current account with the rest of the world. 
Hence, within Euroland it is a zero-sum game: one nation’s current account surplus 
is offset by a deficit run by a neighbor. Factoring in triple constraints – an inability 
46 http://www.investorsinsight.com/blogs/john_mauldins_outside_the_box/archive/2010/07/08/
europe-the-state-of-the-banking-system.aspx 
47 Another example is provided by the disastrous Irish property price bubble which was a conse-
quence of a massive rise in household debt. It rose from €57 billion in 2003 to €157 billion in 2008 
and now stands at 180% of household disposable income (compared to 40% in 1993). A 2011 au-
dit of the Irish debt estimated a total national debt of €371.1 billion; of this, €279.3 billion (over 
75%) is accounted for by the state-covered debts of the Irish banks, and this, as the audit notes, is 
before taking into account the likelihood that much of the direct government debt of €91.8 billion 




50 Figure 6 depicts current account balances (in % of GDP) for the eurozone and selected mem-
bers; http://www.bridge.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/wisosoz/pdf/Meyer-Eppler/Meyer-
Eppler_2011_Germany_s_Policy_on_Rebalancing.pdf 
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to devalue the euro, a global recession, and a powerful neighbor committed to run-
ning its own trade surpluses – it seems quite unlikely that Greece could move to-
ward a current account surplus.
4. Epilogue
The case of Greece and subsequent explanations of how its crisis emerged and tot-
tered the EU is the continuation of “embedded neoliberalism” and its financial or-
thodoxy which emerged in the 1980s as a reaction to the welfare state crisis in the 
1970s.
Since then, the clash between popular ideas of social justice and economic in-
sistence on market justice has once again changed sites, re-emerging this time 
in international capital markets and the complex contests currently taking place 
between financial institutions and electorates, governments, states and internatio-
nal organizations. (Streeck, 2011: 26)
This means that European policy affects national institutional systems through 
both indirect and direct mechanisms. From a transformationalist perspective, the 
indirect impact largely stems from the competitive dynamics of the increasingly 
open market that the EU has created. This new market transforms the context within 
which economic actors must operate. However, the strongest source of transforma-
tive power available to the EU derives from the strength of its central institutions and 
its legal systems (McCann, 2010). Considerable controversy has been attached to 
Commission initiatives and ECJ judgements in the area of corporate law before the 
crisis emerged.51 This is clear evidence that since the 1980s the project of European 
integration has been almost exclusively market-led, and common social denomina-
tors have lagged behind. After the eurocrisis had occurred, the Commission started 
to push the member states to follow mostly neoliberal measures through a variety of 
other directives ensuring longer work weeks and working lives and the gradual align-
ment of wages and social benefits according to the lowest common denominators.52 At 
the same time, it has done nothing significant to advocate the creation of common fis-
cal standards which would have ended tax competition, a race to the bottom to attract 
investment and boost output that could be freely sold throughout the EU.
51 In September 2008, for example, former President Roman Herzog published a polemic enti-
tled “Stop the ECJ!”. He accused the Luxembourg judges of grabbing ever-greater competences 
at the expense of the member states and urged the Constitutional Court to invalidate several con-
troversial ECJ rulings. Herzog’s broadside resonated across Europe, where for some time there 
has been considerable disquiet about “judicial activism” and what some see as an irreversible 
trend toward empowerment of the ECJ and other EU institutions. http://www.project-syndicate.
org/commentary/obrennan5/English
52 http://www.tni.org/article/greece-marks-failure-eu-integration
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The new EU neoliberal economic governance in crisis mode is best reflected 
in the Euro Pact and the “Six-Pack”. The Euro Pact was adopted at the EU sum-
mit on March 24, 2011. The wording of the Euro Pact is remarkably clear. The so-
lution to the crisis lies in austerity and low wages. To achieve “competitiveness”, 
member states must reform labor law and keep wages low to ensure it. In order to 
ensure “sound public finances”, member states should first turn to “sustainability of 
pensions, health care and social benefits”, and this translates into cutting social ex-
penditure.53 The so-called “Six-Pack”, which is made of five regulations and one di-
rective proposed by the European Commission, represents the most comprehensive 
reinforcement of economic governance in the EU and the euro area since the launch 
of the Economic Monetary Union almost 20 years ago, and it was approved by 23 
EU member states on December 12, 2011.54 The provisions of the “Six-Pack” oblige 
countries to keep their budget deficits below 3% of GDP and government debt be-
low (or sufficiently declining towards) 60% of GDP, or they will be facing Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP) upon which they might end up paying a fine of 0.1% of their 
respective GDP.55 Institutional setup like this essentially disables expansionary and 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Although United Kingdom refrained from signing the 
“Six-Pack” treaty, it seems that David Cameron’s mantra prevails in the heads of ma-
jor policy-makers in the rest of the EU, and it means: “Government debt is the same 
as credit-card debt; it’s got to be paid back”.56
So for bankers, the line of least resistance is to foster an illusion that there is no 
need for them to accept defaults on the unpayable high debts they have largely en-
couraged by creating artificial convergence in the context of the EMU. Creditors al-
ways insist that the debt overhead can be maintained – if governments simply reduce 
other expenditures, while raising taxes on individuals and non-financial business. 
Essentially, this means that democratic states are being turned into debt-collecting 
agencies on behalf of a global oligarchy of investors because member states are un-
able to print their currency (Streeck, 2011: 28). Many authors from diverse institu-
tions, such as Gerry Epstein57, Leo Panitch58 and Robert Johnson59, claim that there 
has been a group of bankers, industrialists and politicians in Europe who never really 
accepted the welfare state, and this is clearly in line with critical theory assumptions. 





57 Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
58 York University, Toronto.
59 Roosevelt Institute, New York.
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60-70 years ago. Contextually speaking, the social welfare contract that European 
businesses had installed at the end of WW2 was like an insurance premium that was 
paid so that society did not convert to the communist side. Since the Berlin wall fell 
down, there has been no threat of communism and that whole social architecture, the 
social contract, is now very expensive.60 Several facts could provide credibility to 
this conclusion. At the last G-20 meeting in November in Cannes, the G-20 minis-
ters essentially handed the task of solving the eurocrisis to the EU and the ECB and 
the German and French governments. Soon afterwards, they have handed it back 
to the IMF, and the IMF handed it back to the G-20. The hot-potato game is clearly 
demonstrating that none of the actors above has the will or courage to tackle the is-
sue. Meanwhile, this policy stance enables the entrenchment of particular ideas such 
as the austerity agenda already explained above. The other part of the puzzle is the 
ECB’s actions, which appeared to be an attempt to ratchet up the pressure on EU po-
liticians to act in concert to implement reforms and make changes in order to address 
the structural issues affecting the economies in Europe, precisely by its flexible and 
lack-of-principle approach vis-a-vis the purchase of member states bonds.61 
The current approach to crisis-solving can be described as Darwinian biopoli-
tics (member states with strong political regimes, but democratically weak insti-
tutions) and neoliberal economics (fiscally sound, market-conforming economies 
free of social welfare).62 This approach will prove doubly disastrous. Apart from the 
fact that it will condemn millions of Europeans to decades of poverty, it will also 
undermine the effort to save the euro. If EU and eurozone are poised to break out 
of this vicious cycle and deflationary trap, while ensuring much vaunted prosperity 
and economic growth, its policy-makers and economists should look more careful-
ly to contributions of critical theory and social constructivism in realizing how the 
eurocrisis really emerged and how it has been portrayed afterwards in the popular 
discourse. To prevent the ship from sinking, one has to try to plug the hole, and not 
waste time moving chairs around on the deck. This effectively underlines the need 
for EU’s integrated measures for macro-economic stimulation, such as integrated 
tax structure, a central bank dedicated to economic prosperity, and a reduction of 
the financial sector. Only this will restore democratic legitimacy, which will then be 
combined with deep economic integration as a part of an augmented open-economy 
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be achieved by regulation, by taxation and by restructuring the debts of the Mediter-
ranean states which is best summed up by Averell Harriman’s legendary words: “I 
understand completely. Capital must pay, as well as labor” (Galbraith, 2010).
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DEKONSTRUKCIJA MITA O RASTROŠNOSTI 
KORIŠTENJEM KRITIČKE TEORIJE 
I SOCIJALNOG KONSTRUKTIVIZMA: 
SLUČAJ GRČKE I NJEGOVE ŠIRE SOCIO-
-EKONOMSKE I POLITIČKE POSLJEDICE
Sažetak
Ovaj članak ima namjeru dekonstruirati široko rasprostranjeno mišljenje, 
stvoreno i perpetuirano od strane medija, političkih analitičara, političara i 
komentatora, da pravi uzrok grčke i naknadne eurokrize treba tražiti u veliko-
dušnim socijalnim transferima i neodgovornoj fiskalnoj potrošnji grčkih po-
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litičara i građana. U toj namjeri oslanjam se na kritičku teoriju međunarodnih 
odnosa kao prvi pravac teoretske argumentacije kako bih secirao samu struk-
turu Ekonomske i monetarne unije (EMU) koja je neizbježno vodila prema 
akumuliranju trgovinskih i fiskalnih neravnoteža u zemljama EU periferije. 
Drugi pravac teoretske argumentacije fokusiran je na teoriju socijalnog kon-
struktivizma kao analitičkog oruđa u svrhu poimanja teze o “grčkoj rastroš-
nosti”. Posljedična difuzija konzervativnih stavova vezanih uz ulogu države 
blagostanja stavljena je u kontekst “novog konstitucionalizma” i neoliberalne 
politike. Primjena obje teorije važna je zbog identifikacije krivaca u smislu 
aktera, struktura i procesa koji su zajedno doveli do potencijalno smrtonosne 
kombinacije europske bankarske i krize suverenog duga po budućnost inte-
gracijskog projekta. Stoga ovaj članak ukazuje na potrebu promjene politike 
prema zemljama “svinjama” (PIIGS) kao i na reformu temelja Ekonomske i 
monetarne unije. 
Ključne riječi: kritička teorija, socijalni konstruktivizam, EMU, kriza u euro-
zoni, grčka rastrošnost, “ugrađeni neoliberalizam”
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